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Lattice Codes for the Wiretap Gaussian
Channel: Construction and Analysis
Fre´de´rique Oggier, Patrick Sole´ and Jean-Claude Belfiore
Abstract
We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel, where two legitimate players Alice and Bob communicate
over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, while Eve is eavesdropping, also through
an AWGN channel. We propose a coding strategy based on lattice coset encoding. We analyze Eve’s
probability of decoding, from which we define the secrecy gain as a design criterion for wiretap lattice
codes, expressed in terms of the lattice theta series, which characterizes Eve’s confusion as a function
of the channel parameters. The secrecy gain is studied for even unimodular lattices, and an asymptotic
analysis shows that it grows exponentially in the dimension of the lattice. Examples of wiretap lattice
codes are given. Interestingly, minimizing Eve’s probability of error involves the same optimization of
the theta series as does the flatness factor, another newly defined code design that characterizes lattice
codes that achieve strong secrecy.
Index Terms
Gaussian channel, Lattice codes, Secrecy gain, Theta series, Wiretap codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner [34] as a discrete memoryless broadcast channel where
the sender, Alice, transmits confidential messages to a legitimate receiver Bob, in the presence of an
eavesdropper Eve. Wyner defined the perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum amount of information
that Alice can send to Bob while insuring that Eve gets a negligible amount of information. He also
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2described a generic coding strategy known as coset coding, used to encode together both data and random
bits to confuse the eavesdropper. The question of determining the secrecy capacity of many classes of
channels has been addressed extensively recently, yielding a plethora of information theoretical results
on secrecy capacity [19]. In particular, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is known,
and was established in [18].
There is a sharp contrast with the situation of wiretap code designs, where very little is known.
Ozarow and Wyner proposed the so-called wire-tap II codes [25] for a scenario where the channel to
Bob is a noiseless binary channel, while Eve experiences erasures. Recently polar wiretap codes have been
proposed for symmetric binary input channels [22], [12]. The most exploited approach to get practical
codes so far has been to use LDPC codes, for binary erasure and symmetric channels (for example [32]),
but also for Gaussian channels with binary inputs [17].
In this work, we consider lattice codes for Gaussian channels, where Alice uses lattice coset encoding.
Lattice codes for Gaussian channels have been considered from an information theoretical point of view
in [11] in the setting of cooperative jamming, and more recently in [20], [21], where lattice codes have
been considered for respectively the mod Λ Gaussian wiretap channel, and the Gaussian wiretap channel.
Both papers propose the so-called flatness factor as a new design criterion, and [21] proves that nested
lattice codes can achieve semantic and strong secrecy over the Gaussian wiretap channel. We focus here
on a code design criterion, which we derive from minimizing Eve’s probability of correctly decoding.
More precisely, a wiretap lattice code consists of a pair of nested lattices Λe ⊂ Λb, where Λb is a lattice
designed to ensure reliability for Bob, while Λe is a sublattice of Λb that increases Eve’s confusion. We
show that Eve’s probability Pc,e of correctly decoding a message intended to Bob is bounded by a function
that depends on the noise on Eve’s channel, and on the theta series of the lattice Λe at a particular point.
Interestingly, the theta series at that same point also provides an upper bound on the mutual information
between Alice’s message and Eve’s received message [21]. Mimicking the way the coding gain quantifies
how much reliability a particular coding strategy brings with respect to uncoded transmission, we define
the secrecy gain to quantify how much confusion a specific lattice provides compared to using the Zn
lattice. An asymptotic study of the secrecy gain and wiretap lattice codes are further presented.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls the channel model, how lattice coset encoding is
performed, while Section III contains an analysis of Eve’s probability of correctly decoding, from which
design criteria are deduced. The notion of secrecy gain is defined, illustrated and interpreted in Section
IV. It is further analyzed for even unimodular lattices in Section V. The asymptotic analysis which
describes the behavior of the secrecy gain when the lattice dimension grows is presented in Section VI.
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3Finally some wiretap lattice codes can be found in Section VII.
II. CODING SCHEME FOR THE GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. The Gaussian Wiretap Channel
We consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, that is, a broadcast channel where the source (Alice) sends
a signal to a legitimate receiver (Bob), while an illegitimate eavesdropper (Eve) can listen to the trans-
mission. It is modeled by
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve,
where x is the transmitted signal, vb and ve denote the Gaussian noise at Bob, respectively Eve’s side,
both with zero mean, and respective variance σ2b and σ2e (see Figure 1). We assume that Alice knows
Bob’s channel, that is σb, as well as Eve’s channel, σe, though we will also show how to handle the case
where Eve’s channel is unknown (see Section VII).
Alice Bob
Eve
σ2e
σ
2b
Λb/Λe
Data bits encode
Fig. 1. The Gaussian wiretap channel between the sender Alice, and the two receivers Bob and Eve.
Alice’s encoder maps l bits s1, . . . , sl from S = {0, 1} to a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn, and
over a transmission of n symbols, we get
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve.
(1)
We consider the case where Alice uses lattice codes, namely x ∈ Λb, where Λb is an n-dimensional
real lattice (we use the subscript b to refer to the intended legitimate receiver Bob). She then encodes
her l bits into a point x ∈ Λb:
s = (s1, . . . , sl) ∈ {0, 1}l 7→ x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Λb.
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4Note that since Alice encodes a finite number l of bits per codeword, she needs to choose a finite subset
of Λb. The problem of finding a shaping region R is not addressed here.
We recall for the sake of completeness that a lattice Λ is a discrete set of points in Rn, which can be
described in terms of its generator matrix M by [24], [6]
Λ = {x = uM | u ∈ Zm},
where the m rows of M form a linearly independent set of vectors in Rn (so that m ≤ n) which form
a basis of the lattice. To every lattice Λ is associated its dual lattice Λ⋆ defined as follows.
Definition 1: Let Λ be a lattice with generator matrix M . We call its dual lattice the lattice Λ⋆ with
generator matrix (M−1)T .
For any lattice point Pi of a lattice Λ ⊂ Rn, its Voronoi cell is defined by
VΛ(Pi) = {x ∈ Rn, d(x, Pi) ≤ d(x, Pj) for all Pj ∈ Λ}.
All Voronoi cells are the same, thus VΛ(Pi) = VΛ(0) =: V (Λ). The volume of a lattice Λ with generator
matrix M is by definition the volume vol(V(Λ)) of a Voronoi cell, that is
vol(V(Λ)) =
∫
V(Λ)
dx = det(MMT )1/2.
B. Wyner’s Coset Encoding
In order to confuse the eavesdropper, we use coset coding, as proposed in [34], [25]. The idea is that
instead of having a one-to-one correspondence between a vector of information bits and a lattice point,
this vector of information bits is mapped to a set of codewords, namely a coset, after which the point to
be actually transmitted is chosen randomly inside the coset. Consequently, k bits (k ≤ l) of s ∈ {0, 1}l
will carry the information and l − k bits, the randomness.
More precisely, we partition the lattice Λb into a union of disjoint cosets of the form
Λe + c,
with Λe a sublattice of Λb and c an n-dimensional vector. We need 2k cosets to be labeled by the
information vector sd ∈ {0, 1}k :
Λb = ∪2kj=1(Λe + cj)
which means that
|Λb/Λe| = 2k = Vol (V (Λe))Vol (V (Λb)) . (2)
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5Transmitted point
Label points with data + random symbols
Transmitted point
Label points with random symbols
Transmitted point
Label points with data
Fig. 2. Coset Coding with uniform noise: Z/mZ with m = 3.
Once the mapping
sd 7→ Λe + cj(sd)
is done, Alice randomly chooses a point x ∈ Λe + cj(sd) and sends it over the wiretap channel. This is
equivalent to choose a random vector r ∈ Λe. The transmitted lattice point x ∈ Λb is finally of the form
x = r+ c ∈ Λe + c. (3)
We have denoted the sublattice Λe, since it encodes the random bits that are there to increase Eve’s
confusion, and is then the lattice intended for Eve.
The total rate R is then
R = Rs +Re,
where Rs is the information bits rate intended to Bob, and Re is the random bit rate, all per (complex)
channel use:
Rs =
2k
n
⇐⇒ k = nRs
2
, Re =
2r
n
⇐⇒ r = nRe
2
, (4)
where r is the number of random bits.
Intuitively, the meaning of this coding scheme is that we would like Eve to decode perfectly the lattice
Λe whose points are labeled by the random bits. This corresponds to the information-theoretic approach
[19] where it is shown that the secrecy capacity is equal to the difference between Bob’s capacity and
Eve’s and thus, it is desirable that Eve’s capacity is wasted in decoding random bits.
Example 1: Assume that the channel between Alice and Eve is corrupted by an additive uniform noise.
Even though this is not a realistic channel this perfectly illustrates the coset coding strategy. We will see
that, in this case, it is enough to consider the Z lattice.
Consider the one-dimensional case (see Figure 2) where Alice sends one point x ∈ Z. Eve receives
y = x+ v
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6where v is uniformly distributed over the interval
[−m2 , m2 ] for some m ∈ Z, as shown on the upper left
Figure 2. To confuse Eve, Alice performs coset coding as follows:
• she performs the Euclidean division
x = mq + r, 0 ≤ r < m (5)
where the quotient q carries the random symbols while the remainder r carries the data.
• she encodes random symbols using points in mZ (the quotient q) while data symbols are mapped
to elements of Z/mZ (the remainder r). This is illustrated in the upper right and the lower parts of
Figure 2.
Now, as it can be seen in Figure 2, Eve is able to detect with a zero-error probability the value of q in
Equation (5) while all possible values of r will be detected with probability 1m . This means that random
symbols will be detected error-free when the confusion will be maximal for data symbols already when
we use a one-dimensional lattice (that is n = 1).
Unfortunately, Gaussian noise is not bounded: it requires to use n−dimensional lattice codes. Table
1 recalls the one-dimensional approach and shows the equivalent lattices with their respective cosets in
the multi-dimensional approach required by the Gaussian channel.
1−dimensional n−dimensional
Transmitted lattice Z Fine lattice Λb
Random symbols mZ ⊂ Z Coarse lattice Λe ⊂ Λb
Data Z/mZ Cosets Λb/Λe
TABLE I
FROM THE EXAMPLE TO THE GENERAL SCHEME
Example 2: Consider the 2-dimensional lattice 2Z2, that is
2Z2 = {(2x, 2y), x, y ∈ Z},
and its cosets
2Z2 + (0, 1) = {(2x, 2y + 1), x, y ∈ Z},
2Z2 + (1, 1) = {(2x + 1, 2y + 1), x, y ∈ Z},
2Z2 + (1, 0) = {(2x + 1, 2y), x, y ∈ Z}.
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7We note that if we take the union of 2Z2 and its 3 cosets, we recover the lattice Z2:
Z2 = {(x, y), x, y ∈ Z} = 2Z2 ∪ (2Z2 + (0, 1)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 0)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 1)).
This is shown in Figure 3, where 2Z2 is represented by the triangles, 2Z2 + (0, 1) by the squares,
2Z2 + (1, 1) by the circles, and finally 2Z2 + (1, 0) by the stars.
Fig. 3. The lattice Z2 seen as the union of 4 cosets.
Alice wants to communicate a message to Bob using the Gaussian wiretap channel given in (1). Assume
that she can use 2 bits per channel use, she can then label any of the above 4 cosets, say
00 7→ 2Z2, 01 7→ (2Z2 + (0, 1)), 10 7→ (2Z2 + (1, 0)), 11 7→ (2Z2 + (1, 1)).
To transmit the two bits 01, she then randomly picks a point in the coset 2Z2 + (0, 1), say (2, 3), and
sends this point over the wiretap channel.
An interesting point to develop is the comparison, in terms of probability of correct decision for Eve,
between the scheme proposed here and the classical scheme using a 4 − QAM constellation, that is,
only using the symbols in the central square of Figure 3, to illustrate that coset coding does increase
the confusion at the eavesdropper. For the classical 4 − QAM constellation, the symbol probability of
correct decision, at Eve’s end, is given by [26]
Pc,e = 1− 2Q
(√
2Eb
N0
)
(6)
where Eb is the energy per bit and N0 = σ2e is the noise variance. Q(x) is, as usual the error function
defined as
Q(x) =
1√
2π
∫ +∞
x
e−
u2
2 du.
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8For the proposed scheme, the calculation of the probability of correct decision (for coset elements) at
Eve’s side can be done in the following way :
• Decompose the QAM constellation into its real and imaginary parts so that
Pc,e = Pr {xˆ = x} = Pr {xˆ1 = x1}Pr {xˆ2 = x2}
where x = x1 + ix2 is the transmitted QAM symbol and xˆ is the detected QAM symbol. By
symmetry of the constellation, we have
Pr {xˆ1 = x1} = Pr {xˆ2 = x2} =: Pr {xˆ = x} .
• Now, as can be seen on Figure 3
Pr {xˆ = x} = 1
2
(Pr {xˆ = ⋆,△|x = ⋆,△} +Pr {xˆ = ◦,|x = ◦,})
= Pr {xˆ = ⋆,△|x = ⋆,△} = Pr {xˆ = ◦,|x = ◦,}
so that
Pc,e = (Pr {xˆ = ⋆,△|x = ⋆,△})2 . (7)
• By summing over all coset representatives, we finally get that the probability of correct decision for
Eve is
Pc,e =
[
1− 1
3
(
5Q
(√
θ
)
− 4Q
(
3
√
θ
)
+ 3Q
(
5
√
θ
)
− 2Q
(
7
√
θ
)
+Q
(
9
√
θ
))]2
(8)
where θ = 635
Eb
N0
.
Coset Code
4−QAM
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
EbN0 HdBL
P c
,
e
Fig. 4. Probability of the eavesdropper correctly decoding the cosets. 4−QAM vs coset scheme Z2/2Z2
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9As an illustration, Pc,e as computed in (8) is plotted in Figure 2 with the probability of correct decision
for Eve when using a 4−QAM constellation. We observe that, if the SNR is either too big (above 15 dB)
or too small (below -13 dB), there is no gain in using the coset scheme. Indeed, when the SNR goes
below -13 dB, the size of the sphere of noise is such that it includes too many representatives of the
correct coset, so that Eve’s probability of guessing the coset that was sent is not negligible anymore.
The example above shows the benefit of using coset encoding. However, it also illustrates that Pc,e is
no less than 0.3. We need to bring this threshold as low as possible (ideally tending to 0). This can be
done by using multidimensional lattice coding in high dimension.
C. Lattice Coset Coding using Construction A
There are several ways of getting lattice coset codes. We will consider the so-called binary construction
A [8] with binary codes. Take the standard lattice Zn ∈ Rn and reduce it modulo 2 :
ρ : Zn → (Z/2Z)n = {0, 1}n.
Let C be a linear binary code with parameters (n, κ, d), that is a map from {0, 1}κ to {0, 1}n with
minimum Hamming distance d. We can partition an n-dimensional lattice Λ as follows:
Λ = 2Zn + C =
⋃
ci∈C
(2Zn + ci).
This is also equivalent to say that Λ is the preimage of C in Zn: Λ = ρ−1(C).
Example 2 falls in this category. Take the universe code C with parameters (2, 2, 1), given explicitly
by {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Then
Z2 = 2Z2 +C = (2Z2 + (0, 0)) ∪ (2Z2 + (0, 1)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 0)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 1)).
Another 2-dimensional example is given by the checkerboard lattice D2, formed by integer vectors
(x1, x2) such that x1 + x2 is even. Consider the 2-dimensional repetition code {(0, 0), (1, 1)}. Then
D2 = 2Z
2 + C = (2Z2 + (0, 0)) ∪ (2Z2 + (1, 1)).
A more interesting example is the construction of the Scha¨ffli lattice D4, formed by (x1, x2, x3, x4) such
that x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 is even:
D4 = 2Z
4 + (4, 3, 2)
where (4, 3, 2) is the parity-check binary code of length 4, dimension 3 and minimum distance 2.
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III. PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Coset Decoding
After transmission over the Gaussian wiretap channel, Bob and Eve receive respectively (see (1) and
(3))
y = x+ vb = r+ c+ vb
z = x+ ve = r+ c+ ve,
where we recall that r ∈ Λe encodes the random bits, and c is the coset representative of minimum
energy labeled by the information bits. Both Bob and Eve are interested in decoding the information bits,
namely in finding the correct coset that was sent. To do so, they need to find the closest lattice point in
Λb to their respective received signal y or z, from which they deduce the coset to which it corresponds.
Now when transmitting a codeword x in Λ ⊂ Rn with Voronoi cell VΛ(x) over an additive white
Gaussian noise channel with noise variance σ2, the decoder makes the correct decision if and only if the
noisy vector y is in VΛ(x), an event of probability
1
(σ
√
2π)n
∫
VΛ(x)
e−||y−x||
2/2σ2dy.
In our scenario, the probability Pc of correct decision concerns not just one point but a coset, and thus
it is the probability that the received signal lies in the union of the Voronoi regions of Λb, translated by
points of Λe. Suppose that the lattice point x = r+ c ∈ Λb has been transmitted, with r ∈ Λe ∩R ⊂ Λb,
where R is the shaping region of the constellation. The probability Pc of finding the correct coset is
thus,
Pc =
1
(σ
√
2π)n
∑
t∈Λe∩R
∫
VΛb(x+t)
e−||y−x||
2/2σ2dy. (9)
Since all terms in the sum of Equation (9) are positive, we can upperbound it by extending the
summation over the whole lattice Λe, which gives
Pc ≤ 1
(σ
√
2π)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
VΛb(x+t)
e−||y−x||
2/2σ2dy.
If we take M codewords from Λb, then and by doing the change of variable, u = y − x− t we get
Pc ≤ 1
(σ
√
2π)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−||u+t||
2/2σ2du. (10)
Accordingly, the probability Pc,b of Bob’s (resp. Pc,e of Eve’s) correct decision is:
Pc,b ≤ 1
(
√
2πσb)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u+t‖
2/2σ2bdu (11)
Pc,e ≤ 1
(
√
2πσe)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u+t‖
2/2σ2edu. (12)
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Since Bob’s received vector y is most likely to lie in the Voronoi region of Λb around the transmitted
point (Alice chooses Λb to fit Bob’s channel), the terms in t different from 0 in (11) are negligible,
which yields:
Pc,b ≤ 1
(
√
2πσb)n
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u‖
2/2σ2bdu. (13)
This is now the familiar case of transmitting lattice points over the Gaussian channel, for which it is
known that Λb should have a good Hermite parameter, to get a good coding gain [6].
B. Eve’s Probability of Correct Decision
By (12), we need to evaluate
1
(
√
2πσe)n
∑
t∈Λe
∫
V(Λb)
e−‖u+t‖
2/2σ2edu =
∫
V(Λb)
1
(
√
2πσe)n
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖u+t‖
2/2σ2edu (14)
where t ∈ Λe. By denoting
f(t) = e−‖u+t‖
2/2σ2e ,
the Poisson formula for lattices (see (52) in the appendix) yields that∑
t∈Λe
f(t) = vol(V(Λe))−1
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆e
fˆ(t⋆)
where Λ⋆ is the dual lattice of Λ (see Definition 1). We next compute fˆ(t⋆), which by definition is
fˆ(t⋆) =
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈t
∗,v〉f(v)dv
=
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈t
∗,v〉e
−||u||2−2〈u,v〉−||v||2
2σ2e dv
=
n∏
j=1
e
−u2
j
2σ2e
∫
R
e
vj
(
−2πit⋆j−
2uj
2σ2e
)
e
−v2
j
2σ2e dvj
=
n∏
j=1
√
2πσ2ee
−u2
j
2σ2e e
2σ2e
(
πit⋆j+
uj
2σ2e
)
2
using that ∫
R
e−ax
2
e−2bxdx =
√
π/aeb
2/a, a > 0. (15)
This yields
1
(
√
2πσe)n
∑
t∈Λe
f(t) = vol(V(Λe))−1
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆
n∏
j=1
e
−u2
j
2σ2e e
2σ2e
(
−πit⋆j+
uj
2σ2e
)
2
= vol(V(Λe))−1
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆
e−π
22σ2e ||t∗||2e−2πi〈t
∗,u〉
= vol(V(Λe))−1
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆
e−π
22σ2e ||t∗||2 cos(2π〈t∗,u〉)
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by noting that the sine term of the exponential averages out to zero when summing over all lattice points,
and
Pc,e ≤ vol(V(Λe))−1
∫
V(Λb)
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆
e−π
22σ2e ||t∗||2 cos(2π〈t∗,u〉)du.
Now the cosine term takes it maximum value (that is 1) when u ∈ Λ, and we further get
Pc,e ≤ vol(V(Λe))−1
∫
V(Λb)
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆
e−π
22σ2e ||t∗||2du
=
vol(V(Λb))
vol(V(Λe))
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆
e−π
22σ2e ||t∗||2 .
To obtain an expression which depends on Λ instead of Λ⋆, we denote this time
f(t⋆) = e−2π
2σ2e‖t⋆‖2 ,
and the Poisson formula for lattices (see (52) in the appendix) now gives that
∑
t⋆∈Λ⋆e
f(t⋆) = vol(V(Λe))
∑
t∈Λ
fˆ(t)
where fˆ(t) is
fˆ(t) =
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈t,v〉f(v)dv
=
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈t,v〉e−2π
2σ2e ||v||2dv
=
n∏
j=1
∫
R
e−2πitjvje−2π
2σ2ev
2
j dvj
=
(
1√
2πσ2e
)n n∏
j=1
e
−t2
j
2σ2e
=
(
1√
2πσ2e
)n
e
− ||t||2
2σ2e
using that (15). Finally the probability of making a correct decision for Eve is summarized by
Pc,e ≤ 1
(
√
2πσe)n
vol(V(Λb))
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e . (16)
We can equivalently rewrite it in terms of generalized SNR (GSNR) γΛe(σe) as
Pc,e ≤ vol(V(Λe))
(2πσ2e)
n/2
vol(V(Λb))
vol(V(Λe))
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e = γΛe(σe)
n/22−nRs/2
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e (17)
where
γΛe(σe) =
vol(V(Λe))2/n
2πσ2e
(18)
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is the generalized signal-to-noise ratio (GSNR), and using (2) and (4).
We know how to design good codes for Bob’s channel, and have his probability of making a correct
decision arbitrarily close to 1. Our aim is thus to minimize the probability Pc,e of Eve making a correct
decision, while keeping Pc,b unchanged. This is equivalent to minimize (16), that is to find a lattice Λb
which is as good as possible for the Gaussian channel [6], and which contains a sublattice Λe such that
minimize w.r. Λe
∑
t∈Λe e
−‖t‖2/2σ2e
under the constraint log2 |Λb/Λe| = k.
(19)
The constraint on the cardinality of cosets (or rate) is equivalent to set the fundamental volume of Λe
equal to a constant.
It is natural to start by approximating the sum of exponentials by its terms of higher order, namely
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e ≃ 1 +
∑
t∈Λe,||t||=dmin(Λe)
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e
= 1 + τ(Λe)e
−dmin(Λe)2/2σ2e , (20)
where τ(Λe) is the kissing number of Λe which counts the number of vectors of length dmin(Λe). Thus
as a first criterion, we should maximize dmin(Λe) while preserving the fundamental volume of Λe, which
is equivalent to require for Λe to have a good Hermite parameter
γH(Λ) =
d2min(Λ)
det(MMT )1/n
after which we should minimize its kissing number. However we cannot be content with this approxi-
mation, and have to obtain a more precise analysis as will be shown later on.
IV. THE SECRECY GAIN: A DESIGN CRITERION
Let us get back to the code design criterion (19) and rewrite it in terms of the theta series of the lattice
considered. Recall that given a lattice Λ ⊂ Rn, its theta series ΘΛ is defined by [6]
ΘΛ(z) =
∑
x∈Λ
q‖x‖
2
, q = eiπz, Im(z) > 0. (21)
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Example 3: Let us compute the theta series of Zn:
ΘZn(q) =
∑
x∈Zn
q||x||
2
=
∑
(x1,...,xn)∈Zn
qx
2
1
+...+x2n
=
∑
x1∈Z
qx
2
1 · · ·
∑
xn∈Z
qx
2
n
=
(∑
n∈Z
qn
2
)n
= ΘZ(q)
n.
Exceptional lattices have theta series that can be expressed as functions of the Jacobi theta functions
ϑi(q), q = e
iπz
, Im(z) > 0, i = 2, 3, 4, themselves defined by
ϑ2(q) =
∑+∞
n=−∞ q
(n+ 1
2
)
2
, (22)
ϑ3(q) =
∑+∞
n=−∞ q
n2 , (23)
ϑ4(q) =
∑+∞
n=−∞ (−1)n qn
2
. (24)
A few examples of theta series of exceptional lattices [6] are given in Table II.
Lattice Λ Theta series ΘΛ
Cubic lattice Zn ϑn3
Checkerboard lattice Dn 12 (ϑ
n
3 + ϑ
n
4 )
Gosset lattice E8 12
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)
Leech lattice Λ24 18
(
ϑ82 + ϑ
8
3 + ϑ
8
4
)3 − 45
16
(ϑ2 · ϑ3 · ϑ4)8
TABLE II
THETA SERIES OF SOME EXCEPTIONAL LATTICES
From (19), we need to minimize
∑
t∈Λe
e−‖t‖
2/2σ2e =
∑
t∈Λe
(
e−1/2σ
2
e
)||t||2
=
∑
t∈Λe
(
(eiπ)−1/2iπσ
2
e
)||t||2
= ΘΛe
(
z =
−1
2iπσ2e
)
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with q = eiπz and
Im
( −1
2iπσ2e
)
= Im
(
i
2πσ2e
)
> 0.
Thus to minimize Eve’s probability of correct decision is equivalent to minimize ΘΛe(z) in z = i/2πσ2e ,
under the constraint that log2 |Λb/Λe| = k. To approach this problem, let us set y = −iz and restrict to
real positive values of y. We are now interested in minimizing
ΘΛe(y) =
∑
t∈Λe
q‖t‖
2
, q = e−πy, y > 0,
over all possible Λe, in the particular value of y corresponding to z = i/2πσ2e , namely
y =
1
2πσ2e
. (25)
Remark 1: From an information theory point of view, the information leaked to the eavesdropper
is measured in terms of equivocation, that is H(Sl|Zn), where S and Z denote random variables
corresponding respectively to the data and the message received by Eve. The best possible secrecy
is achieved when H(Sl|Zn) = H(Sl), or equivalently when
I(Sl;Zn) = H(Sl)−H(Sl|Zn) = 0.
How to design codes using the mutual information I(Sl;Zn) as a characterization of secrecy is not yet
well understood. Recent progresses appeared in [21, Theorem 5], where it was shown for the Gaussian
wiretap channel that
I(Sl;Zn) ≤ 8ǫnnR− 8ǫn log 8ǫn = ǫn(8nR − 8 log 8ǫn),
where [21, Proposition 1]
ǫn = γΛe(σe)
n/2ΘΛe(1/2πσ
2
e )− 1,
and γΛe(σe) is the generalized signal-to-noise ratio defined in (18). Both this information theory approach
and our error probability approach agree on the fact that ΘΛe(1/2πσ2e ), that is the theta series of the
lattice Λe intended for Eve at the point 1/2πσ2e should be minimized. This bound is computed assuming
a specific coding scheme, which takes into account a power constraint. Note that when we let the
power grow, which corresponds to the scenario of the current paper, the way Alice encodes her message
corresponds to choosing a point uniformly at random in a given coset, as is the case here. The interested
reader may refer to [21] for the connection between the flatness factor ǫΛe(σe) and the notion of strong
secrecy.
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A. Definition of Strong and Weak Secrecy Gains
Mimicking the way the coding gain captures the benefit of a good coding strategy with respect to no
coding in terms of probability of error, we introduce the (strong) secrecy gain to characterize how a good
lattice Λe increases the confusion at the eavesdropper, compared to choosing Λe = Zn.
Definition 2: The strong secrecy gain χΛ,strong of an n−dimensional lattice Λ is defined by
χΛ,strong = sup
y>0
ΞΛ(y),
where ΞΛ(y) is the secrecy function of Λ, defined as follows.
Definition 3: Let Λ be an n−dimensional lattice of volume λn. The secrecy function of Λ is given by
ΞΛ(y) =
ΘλZn(y)
ΘΛ(y)
defined for y > 0.
These definitions deserve several observations.
Remark 2: 1) The problem of minimizing ΘΛe(y) under the rate constraint log2 |Λb/Λe| = k means
that the optimization must be performed among lattices with the same volume. To do so, we fix as
reference a scaled version of the cubic lattice λZn, where λ is a scaling factor which guarantees
that Λe and λZn have the same fundamental volume, namely, λ = n
√
vol(V(Λe)).
2) We are interested in the secrecy function at the chosen point y = 12πσ2e . However, by considering
σ2e as a variable, and since we want to minimize the expression of Eve’s probability of correct
decision in (19), it makes sense to further maximize the secrecy function over y > 0.
3) The secrecy function depends on σ2e . When Eve’s channel is very noisy, there is no need for a subtle
coding strategy (Λe = Zn will do), and vice-versa, when Eve’s channel is too good, wiretap coding
cannot help (Λe = Zn will again do). This is illustrated on Figure 5 where the behavior of the theta
series of Z80 and of another lattice Λ80 1, both multiplied by the generalized SNR (GSNR), are
compared, as a function of the GSNR (see (18)). As a consequence, the secrecy function of a given
lattice Λ being the ratio of its theta series and the theta series of λZn captures the region where
wiretap coding is most meaningful, and provides an approximation of the ratio of the respective
probabilities of correct decision.
Since the maximum value in Definition 2 is not easy to calculate for a general lattice, we also introduce
a weaker definition of secrecy gain. By (multiplicative) symmetry point, we mean a point y0 such that
ΞΛ(y0 · y) = ΞΛ(y0/y)
1See Subsection V-C for more details about this lattice.
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Fig. 5. A comparison between ΘΛγeΛe for Λ = Z
80 and Λ80. Rs = 1 bit per real dimension.
for all y > 0. We remark that the variable y appears in the exponent, explaining the multiplicative
notation. One could alternatively express the symmetry point in terms of log y and log y0, yielding
ΞΛ(log y0 + log y) = ΞΛ(log y0 − log y).
Definition 4: Suppose that Λ is an n-dimensional lattice, whose secrecy function has a symmetry point
y0. Then the weak secrecy gain χΛ of Λ is given by
χΛ = ΞΛ (y0) =
ΘλZn(y0)
ΘΛ(y0)
,
where we recall that λ = vol(V(Λ)) 1n = |det(M)| 1n .
B. Lattices Equivalent to their Duals
Let us consider the class of lattices Λ such that Λ is equivalent to its dual Λ⋆, that is, the dual lattice
Λ⋆ can be obtained from the lattice Λ by (possibly) a rotation, reflection, and change of scale α > 0:
Λ ∼ αΛ⋆.
In fact, if Λ ∼ αΛ⋆, then α cannot be any positive number. Indeed, we deduce from the equivalence
between both lattices that
vol(V(Λ)) = αnvol(V(Λ⋆)).
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But since Λ and Λ⋆ are dual, then
vol(V(Λ)) = 1
vol(V(Λ⋆)) .
From these two equalities, we get
α = vol(V(Λ)) 2n .
If α = 1, we say that Λ is isodual. Alternatively
Definition 5: A lattice is isodual if it can be obtained from its dual by (possibly) a rotation or reflection.
If M is the generator matrix of Λ and (M−1)T the one of its dual, this means that (M−1)T = UMB
where U is a matrix with integer entries and determinant ±1 and B is a real orthogonal matrix. Thus
the Gram matrix G of Λ, which is by definition G = MMT , is related to the Gram matrix of its dual
by (M−1)TM−1 = UMBBTMTUT = UGUT . A simple example of isodual lattice is Zn, since its
generator matrix M = In, and the one of its dual is (M−1)T = In, and both Gram matrices are the
n-dimensional identity In. It follows from the definition of Λ isodual that ΘΛ(y) = ΘΛ⋆(y), since the
theta series depends on the norm ||x||2, x ∈ Λ, which does not change by rotation or reflection of the
lattice. We are now ready to establish the weak secrecy gain of isodual lattices.
Proposition 1: The secrecy function of an isodual lattice has a multiplicative symmetry point at y = 1.
Proof: The secrecy function of an isodual lattice Λ and the one of its dual Λ⋆ are the same:
ΞΛ(y) =
ΘZn(y)
ΘΛ(y)
= ΞΛ⋆(y).
Jacobi’s formula (53) gives, using that Zn and Λ are isodual and have thus volume 1, that

ΘZn(y) = y
−n
2ΘZn
(
1
y
)
ΘΛ(y) = y
−n
2ΘΛ⋆
(
1
y
)
and
ΞΛ(y) =
ΘZn
(
1
y
)
ΘΛ⋆
(
1
y
) = ΞΛ
(
1
y
)
.
This shows that y0 = 1 is a multiplicative symmetry point for the secrecy function, which concludes the
proof.
Consider again a lattice Λ equivalent to its dual, though not necessarily isodual. The above result easily
extends to this case.
Proposition 2: The weak secrecy gain of a lattice equivalent to its dual is achieved at
y = vol(V(Λ))− 2n ,
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
19
that is
χΛ = ΞΛ
(
1
vol(V(Λ)) 2n
)
.
Proof: We can in fact always scale the lattice Λ as
Λ′ =
1
vol(V(Λ)) 1n
Λ
so that Λ′ is isodual. Now, since the theta series of a scaled lattice is
ΘβΛ(y) = ΘΛ
(
β2y
)
,
with here β = vol(V(Λ))−1, we deduce that
ΞΛ
(
vol(V(Λ))− 2n · y
)
= ΞΛ′(y) = ΞΛ′
(
1
y
)
= ΞΛ
(
vol(V(Λ))− 2n
y
)
,
which shows the existence, for ΞΛ, of a multiplicative symmetry point at y0 = vol(V(Λ))− 2n .
Conjecture 1: For a lattice equivalent to its dual, the weak secrecy gain and the strong secrecy gain
coincide. In particular, this means that the secrecy function of isodual lattices achieves its maximum at
y = 1.
Note that a related problem has been addressed in [7]: for a fixed dimension n, find the lattice that
minimizes ΘΛ(y) for some value y. Unfortunately, the obtained results hold for values of y belonging
to a range which is not of interest.
This conjecture is checked below for the lattices E8 and D4.
C. Some Examples
a) The Gosset Lattice E8: The Gosset lattice is a famous 8-dimensional lattice which can be
described by vectors of the form (x1, . . . , x8), xi ∈ Z, or xi ∈ Z + 1/2, such that
∑
xi ≡ 0 mod 2.
This lattice can be obtained by construction A as
√
2E8 = 2Z
8 + (8, 4, 4)
where (8, 4, 4) is the Reed-Mu¨ller code of length 8 and dimension 4, that is the extended binary Hamming
(7, 4) code. E8 is an isodual lattice and its theta series is given in Table II. As it is isodual, the symmetry
point of its secrecy function is y0 = 1. Figure 6 gives the secrecy function of E8. The symmetric point
is also the point at which the secrecy function is maximized. In all plots of the secrecy function, the
horizontal axis will give y in decibels (10 log10(y)) to enlighten the symmetry point. Here, a multiplicative
symmetry point equal to 1 is, of course, represented by an additive symmetry point equal to 0 dB. We
remark that the weak and the strong secrecy gains coincide.
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Fig. 6. Secrecy function of E8.
b) The Scha¨ffli lattice D4: D4 is a 4−dimensional lattice which is not isodual, but it is equivalent
to its dual. Its fundamental volume is 2. This lattice can be obtained by construction A as
D4 = 2Z
4 + (4, 3, 2)
where (4, 3, 2) is the binary parity-check code of length 4. The theta series of D4 is also given in Table II.
The multiplicative symmetry point is now y0 = 1√2 . Figure 7 gives its secrecy function with a symmetry
point equal to −1.5 dB corresponding to 10 log10
(
1√
2
)
. For this lattice also, the weak and the strong
secrecy gains again coincide.
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Fig. 7. Secrecy function of D4.
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D. Operating Point of a Lattice
We are interested in how the secrecy gain is related to the parameters of the Gaussian channel, through
the proposed lattice coset construction. We restrict this discussion to lattices which are equivalent to their
dual. In this case, from a system point of view, it is always possible to scale these lattices to normalize
their volume to 1, in which case we obtain isodual lattices, which we showed have a symmetry point at
y = 1 (see Proposition 1). Thanks to Conjecture 1, we will use the weak secrecy gain instead of the
strong one for isodual lattices and assume that we want the communication system to work at the value
y = 1.
In practice, this is obtained by scaling suitably the lattice Λe for which we define correspondingly its
operating point yo.p. as
yo.p. = Vol (V (Λe))
−2
n .
E82 E84 E8 1 2 E8
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Fig. 8. Secrecy function for scaled versions of E8.
As an example, we see on Figure 8 how the operating point of scaled versions of E8 behaves with
respect to the one of E8. For 2mE8,m ∈ Z,
yo.p. = Vol (V (2mE8))
−1
4 =
(
28m
)− 1
4 = 2−2m
that is −6m dB.
To fit the transmission rate, under the constraint (2), that is
|Λb/Λe| = 2k = Vol (V (Λe))Vol (V (Λb)) ,
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
22
the fundamental volume of Λe is scaled as
Vol (V (Λe)) = 2kVol (V (Λb)) = 2
nRb
2 Vol (V (Λb)) .
Thus
yo.p. = Vol (V (Λe))
−2
n
= 2−RbVol (V (Λb))
−2
n .
Now, the average energy per complex symbol and per complex channel use if Alice sends a Q−QAM
constellation with Q = 2R points and minimum distance 2a is [10]
Es(Q−QAM) = 2(2
R − 1)a2
3
.
This can be easily extended to a (Q−QAM)n2 constellation, which can be seen as a cubically shaped
subset of the n-dimensional lattice 2aZn:
Es([2aZ
n]) = Vol (V (2aZn)) 2n 2
R − 1
6
where [Λ] is a notation to refer to a cubically shaped subset of the lattice Λ. Now assuming that a finite
constellation is carved from Λb with a cubic shaping, its average energy Es([Λb]) differs from the one of
Zn by its coding gain, which shows that we can approximate the energy per complex channel use and
per complex symbol of the signal sent by Alice by
Es([Λb]) ≃ Vol (V (Λb))
2
n
2R − 1
6
≃ 2RVol (V (Λb))
2
n .
Hence, we get
yo.p. = 2
−RsEs([Λb])−12R,
which with yo.p. = 12πσ2e from (25) gives
1
2πσ2e
= 2−(Rs−R)Es([Λb])−1
and finally
1 =
2−(R−Rb)Es([Λb])
2πσ2e
=
2−(R−Rb)
2π
γe (26)
where γe = Es/σ2e is Eve’s signal to noise ratio. This corresponds to a secrecy rate
Rs = R− log2
γe
2π
. (27)
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V. THE SECRECY GAIN OF UNIMODULAR LATTICES
Theta series are difficult to analyze in general, but nevertheless they have nice properties for some
families of lattices, such as even unimodular lattices, which we will study in this section.
Let Λ be a lattice with generator matrix M and Gram matrix G = MMT .
Definition 6: [8, Chap. 1] A lattice Λ is unimodular if
1) Λ is integral, i.e., its Gram matrix has entries in Z,
2) Λ = Λ⋆.
It is furthermore even unimodular (or of type II) if
‖x‖2 ≡ 0 mod 2,∀x ∈ Λ.
Note that a unimodular lattice has fundamental volume equal to 1. Unimodular lattices are in particular
isodual lattices, for which the weak secrecy gain is reached in y = 1, or log y = 0 (see Proposition 1),
and conjectured to be equal to the strong secrecy gain. We start by giving two examples of computations
of the weak secrecy gain Ξ(1) for two exceptional even unimodular lattices E8 and Λ24.
A. The Secrecy Gain of Two Exceptional Unimodular Lattices
The most important formulas we will use are related to Jacobi theta functions (22)-(24) and can be
found in [33]. They are
ϑ2
(
e−π
)
= ϑ4
(
e−π
)
ϑ3
(
e−π
)
=
4
√
2ϑ4
(
e−π
) (28)
Gosset Lattice E8: We evaluate the value of the secrecy function ΞE8 at the point y = 1 (Figure 6
displays the secrecy function of E8). From Table II, we have that
ΞE8(y) =
ϑ3(e
−π)8
1
2 [ϑ2(e
−π)8 + ϑ3(e−π)8 + ϑ4(e−π)8]
.
It is easier to look at (ΞE8(y))−1, which we evaluate in y = 1:
1
ΞE8(1)
=
1
2
(
ϑ2(e
−π)8 + ϑ3(e−π)8 + ϑ4(e−π)8
)
ϑ3(e−π)8
=
1
2
(
1 +
2ϑ4(e
−π)8
4ϑ4(e−π)8
)
=
3
4
using (28). We thus deduce that the secrecy gain of E8 is
χE8 = ΞE8(1) =
4
3
= 1.33333
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
24
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
y HdBL
X
L
24
Hy
L
Fig. 9. Secrecy function of Λ24
Leech Lattice Λ24: From Table II, we get
1
ΞΛ24(1)
=
1
8
(
ϑ2(e
−π)8 + ϑ3(e−π)8 + ϑ4(e−π)8
)3 − 4516ϑ2(e−π)8ϑ3(e−π)8ϑ4(e−π)8
ϑ3(e−π)24
=
63
8 ϑ4(e
−π)24 − 454 ϑ4(e−π)24
ϑ3(e−π)24
=
63
256
again using (28), showing that the secrecy gain of Λ24 is
χΛ24 = ΞΛ24(1) =
256
63
= 4.0635
The secrecy function of Λ24 is shown on Figure 9.
B. Theta series of Even Unimodular Lattices
The theory of theta series of even unimodular lattices is well established2. We first give some definitions
that will be useful for the calculation of the secrecy gain.
Definition 7: Consider the following two series
E2k(q) = 1− 4k
B2k
+∞∑
m=1
m2k−1
q2m
1− q2m (29)
and
G2k(q) = 2ζ(2k)E2k(q),
2They are actually modular forms with integral weight [8], [6]
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where Bk are the Bernoulli numbers [29] defined by
x
ex − 1 =
∞∑
l=0
Bl
xl
l!
, (30)
k is an integer such that k ≥ 2, ζ is the Riemann zeta function, and q = eiπz , Im(z) > 0. These series
are referred to3 as Eisenstein series [8, Chap. 2, §5].
Note that these definitions hold for even k′, so that depending on the notations, one can write either k′
even, or as we choose here k′ = 2k, for k a positive integer. Furthermore, the argument q can be either
q = eiπz or q = e2iπz . Since so far we have always used q = eiπ, we keep this notation but then have
to introduce a power of 2 in the exponent of q.
The Riemann zeta function ζ and the Bernoulli numbers are related by
ζ(2k) = (−1)k+1 (2π)
2k
(2k)!
(
B2k
2
)
,
and it is known [29] that B4 = −1/30, B6 = 1/42. This allows us to compute that
(60G4(q))
3 − 27(140G6(q))2 = (120ζ(4))3E4(q)3 − 27(280ζ(6))2E6(q)2
=
(2π)12
123
(E4(q)
3 − E6(q)2).
We call
∆(q) =
1
123
(
E34(q)− E26(q)
) (31)
the function that appears in the above computation, up to a factor of (2π)12 [8, Chap. 2, §5], which is
called the modular discriminant4.
Remarkably, theta series of all even unimodular lattices can be expressed as polynomials in the two
variables E4(q) and ∆(q):
Proposition 3: If Λ is an even unimodular lattice of dimension n, then
1) n = 24m + 8k, for some positive integer m, and some k ∈ {0, 1, 2} (as a consequence, n is a
multiple of 8),
2) its theta series can be expressed, given k,m in 1), as
ΘΛ(q) = E
3m+k
4 (q) +
m∑
j=1
bjE
3(m−j)+k
4 (q)∆
j(q), bj ∈ Q. (32)
3The expression we use here as a definition is classically derived as a Fourier transform of another expression: G2k(τ ) =
1
2
∑
m,n
1
(mτ+n)2k
, (m,n) 6= 0, Im(τ ) > 0.
4Different authors may or may not include the factor (2π)12 in the definition of modular discriminant.
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Proof: The proof can be found in [8].
Now the two “base” series E4(q) and ∆(q) are simply related to the Jacobi theta functions as [6]

E4(q) =
1
2
(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
)
∆(q) = 1256ϑ2(q)
8ϑ3(q)
8ϑ4(q)
8
(33)
Equations (33) and (32) can be used to obtain a relation between the secrecy gain of an even unimodular
lattice Λ of dimension n = 24m+ 8k, on the one hand, and the ratios
ρE4 =
E4 (e
−π)
ϑ83 (e
−π)
and
ρ∆ =
∆(e−π)
ϑ243 (e
−π)
on the other hand, since
ΘΛ(q)
ϑ3(q)24m+8k
=
(
E4(q)
ϑ3(q)8
)3m+k
+
m∑
j=1
bj
(
E4(q)
ϑ3(q)8
)3(m−j)+k
+
(
∆(q)
ϑ3(q)24
)j
and thus
1
χΛ
= ρ3m+kE4 +
m∑
j=1
bjρ
3(m−j)+k
E4
ρj∆, bj ∈ Q. (34)
We can further deduce that
Theorem 1: The (weak) secrecy gain of an even unimodular lattice is a rational number.
Proof: Note that
ρE4 =
1
χE8
=
3
4
,
and using (33) and (28), we get
ρ∆ =
∆(e−π)
ϑ243 (e
−π)
=
1
212
.
The proof then follows from Equation (34).
C. Extremal Even Unimodular Lattices
E8 and Λ24 are extremal even unimodular lattices in dimensions 8 and 24 respectively [6]. We define
below what is an extremal even unimodular lattice.
Since we have that
E4(q) = 1 +
∞∑
j=1
αjq
2j and ∆(q) =
∞∑
j=1
βjq
2j
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Dimension Lattice Λ ΘΛ
8 E8 E4
24 Λ24 E
3
4 − 720∆
32 BW32 E
4
4 − 960E4∆
48 P48 E
6
4 − 1440E34∆+ 125280∆2
72 L72 E
9
4 − 2160E64∆+ 965520E34∆2 − 27302400∆3
80 L80 E
10
4 − 2400E74∆+ 1360800E44∆2 − 103488000E4∆3
TABLE III
THETA SERIES OF EXTREMAL LATTICES
for some coefficients αj , βj , we have from (32) that
ΘΛ(q) = 1 +
∞∑
j=1
γjq
2j
for an even unimodular lattice. In order for it to be extremal, we set the coefficients γj = 0, j = 1, . . . ,m,
which yields a linear system of m equations with m unknowns given by b1, . . . , bm. We then obtain the
following development of the theta series of Λ:
ΘΛ(q) = 1 + γ2m+2q
2m+2 +O
(
q2m+4
)
and consequently as upperbound for the minimum norm of Λ:
ν = min
x∈Λ{0}
‖x‖2 ≤ 2⌊m⌋+ 2. (35)
Unimodular lattices achieving the upperbound (35) are called extremal and their theta series, determined
by solving the above system of linear equations in bj , are called extremal theta series. They are given
in Table III for dimensions 8 to 80. We notice that there is only one extremal theta series for a given
dimension. Note that knowing the theta series does not give the corresponding lattice.
We compute further values of secrecy gains for some extremal even unimodular lattices in higher
dimensions. The corresponding secrecy functions are shown on Figure 10, while the different secrecy
gains are summarized in Table IV.
1) Barnes-Wall lattice BW32: A 32-dimensional extremal lattice is the Barnes-Wall lattice BW32. Its
theta series is
ΘBW32(q) =
1
16
(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
) [(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
)3
−30 · ϑ2(q)8 · ϑ3(q)8 · ϑ4(q)8
]
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Fig. 10. Secrecy functions of extremal lattices in dimensions 32, 48, 72 and 80
so that
1
ΞBW32(1)
=
1
16
(
1 +
1
2
)[(
1 +
1
2
)3
− 30 · 1
16
]
=
9
64
,
and finally its secrecy gain is
χBW32 =
64
9
≃ 7.11 .
2) Lattice P48p(q): There are two different extremal even unimodular lattices in dimension 48, P48p
and P48q [6, Chap. 5], having, of course the same theta series:
ΘP48(q) =
1
2048
[
3915ϑ2(q)
16ϑ3(q)
16ϑ4(q)
16
−1440ϑ2(q)8ϑ3(q)8ϑ4(q)8
(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
)3
+32
(
ϑ2(q)
8 + ϑ3(q)
8 + ϑ4(q)
8
)6]
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giving
1
ΞP48(1)
=
1
2048
[
3915
256
− 1440
16
(
1 +
1
2
)3
+ 32
(
1 +
1
2
)6]
=
19467
524288
.
Hence,
χP48 =
524288
19467
≃ 26.93 .
3) Dimensions 72 and 80: In the same way, from Table III, we can compute the secrecy gain for
an extremal unimodular even lattice in dimension 72 (found by G. Nebe [23]) and 80. Note that two
examples of such lattices in dimension 80 have been given in [3]. We have
Dimension 8 24 32 48 72 80
Secrecy gain 1.3 4.1 7.11 26.9 195.7 380
TABLE IV
SECRECY GAINS OF EXTREMAL LATTICES
χΛ72 =
134217728
685881
≃ 195.69
χΛ80 =
536870912
1414413
≃ 379.57
We use the computation of the secrecy gain in dimension 80 to illustrate two claims made earlier.
1) We saw, in Equation (20), the following approximation of the theta series:
∑
t∈Λe
q−‖t‖
2 ≈ 1 + τ(Λe)q−dmin(Λe)2 .
If we were to use this approximation to compute the secrecy gain, we would get
χΛ80 ≈
1 + 160e−π
1 + 1250172000e−8π
= 7.7957
instead of 379.57. This illustrates the importance of considering the whole theta series.
2) Since the secrecy gain approximates the ratio of the respective probabilities of correct decision, we
have that
Pc,e
(
Z80
)
Pc,e (Λ80)
≈ χΛ80 ≈ 380.
We thus reduce Eve’s probability of correct decision of a factor of 380 by using Λ80 instead of
Z80.
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VI. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SECRECY GAIN FOR EVEN UNIMODULAR LATTICES
In this section, we provide an asymptotic analysis of the secrecy gain χΛ for even unimodular lattices
Λ5. We first give a lower bound on the maximal value of χΛ over all even unimodular n−dimensional
lattices, which only depends on the dimension n, after which we show more generally that as n grows,
the secrecy gain itself only depends on n, and not on the choice of a particular unimodular lattice.
A. A lower bound on the maximal secrecy gain
We propose here a lower bound on the theta series of unimodular lattices that maximizes the secrecy
gain, as a function of the dimension n. We then let n grow to get an asymptotic bound. This result relies
on the following Siegel-Weil formula for theta series of even unimodular lattices.
Theorem 2: [29] Let n ≡ 0(mod 8), Ωn be the set of all inequivalent even unimodular n−dimensional
lattices and set k = n2 . Then ∑
Λ∈Ωn
ΘΛ(q)
|Aut(Λ)| = Mn · Ek (q)
where
Mn =
∑
Λ∈Ωn
1
|Aut(Λ)| ,
Ek(q) is the Eisenstein series (29)6, and Aut(Λ) refers to the group of automorphisms of Λ.
Let Θ(n)min(e
−π) = minΛ∈Ωn ΘΛ(e−π). Then
Θ
(n)
min(e
−π)Mn ≤
∑
Λ∈Ωn
ΘΛ(e
−π)
|Aut(Λ)| = MnEk(e
−π)
so that
Θ
(n)
min(e
−π) ≤ Ek(e−π).
Define
χn , max
Λ∈Ωn
χΛ =
ϑn3 (e
−π)
Θ
(n)
min (e
−π)
where [33]
ϑ3
(
e−π
)
=
π
1
4
Γ
(
3
4
) ≃ 1.086
5Theta series of even unimodular lattices are in fact modular forms for the whole modular group SL2 (Z), and all the results
explained in this section actually rely on that property, though we are trying to use it as little as possible so as to make the
paper accessible for people who are not familiar with the theory of modular forms.
6The index k is an abuse of notation with respect to Definition (29).
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to get
χn ≥ ϑ
n
3 (e
−π)
Ek (e−π)
=
(1.086)n
Ek (e−π)
.
Now
Ek
(
e−π
)
= 1 +
2k
|Bk|
+∞∑
m=1
mk−1
e2πm − 1
and for k = 4k′ a multiple of 4, we have
E4k′
(
e−π
)
= 1 +
8k′
|B4k′ |
+∞∑
m=1
m4k
′−1
e2πm − 1 . (36)
An asymptotic expression of the Bernoulli number |B4k′ | is
|B4k′ | = 2 (4k
′)!
(2π)4k′
. (37)
Now, as e2π ≈ 535.5 ≫ 1, we use
e2πm − 1 ∼ e2πm, m ∈ N\{0}
to get
+∞∑
m=1
m4k
′−1
e2πm − 1 ∼
+∞∑
m=1
(
e−2π
)m
m1−4k′
= Li1−4k′
(
e−2π
)
where Lis(x) is the polylogarithm function defined as [2]
Lis(x) =
+∞∑
m=1
xm
ms
.
Now, we use the identity [2]
Li1−4k′
(
e−2π
)
=
(4k′ − 1)!
(2π)4k′
[
ζ(4k′, 1 + i) + ζ(4k′,−i)] (38)
where ζ(s, x) is the so-called Hurwitz zeta function [1]. Combining the 3 equations below
ℑ (ζ(4k′, 1 + i)) = −ℑ (ζ(4k′,−i))
lim
k′→+∞
ℜ (ζ(4k′, 1 + i)) = 0
lim
k′→+∞
ℜ (ζ(4k′,−i)) = 1
with Equation (38), we get
lim
k→+∞
Li1−4k′
(
e−2π
)
(4k′ − 1)!/(2π)4k′ = 1. (39)
Now we are ready to conclude. We combine Equations (36), (37) and (39) to obtain
lim
k′→+∞
E4k′
(
e−π
)
= 1 +
(4k′ − 1)!
(2π)4k′
· (2π)
4k′
(4k′ − 1)! = 2
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Since n = 4k′, we finally conclude that
χn &
1.086n
2
(40)
which grows exponentially in n.
0 20 40 60 80
0
100
200
300
400
Dimension n
Χ
L
n
Fig. 11. Lower bound of the minimal secrecy gain as a function of n from Siegel-Weil formula. Points correspond to extremal
lattices.
Figure 11 gives the asymptotic expression of the secrecy gain as a function of the dimension n, as
well as points corresponding to extremal lattices in dimensions 8, 16, 24, 32, 48, 72 and 80.
This proves that there exists a family of even unimodular lattices whose secrecy gains exponentially
grows up with the dimension, which means that Eve’s probability of correct decision exponentially tends
to 0. But as we can remark in Figure 10, around its maximum, the secrecy function becomes sharper
and sharper when n grows, meaning that for high dimensions, the communication system absolutely has
to operate at the operating point (y = 1 for unimodular lattices).
B. Behavior of the secrecy gain when n grows
Let us now look at the behavior of the secrecy gain when n grows, which depends on the theta series
of the corresponding even unimodular lattice Λ of dimension n, a multiple of 8. The main result used
here is that the theta series of Λ is given by [14, Chap. 11]
ΘΛ(q) = Ek(q) + Sk (q,Λ) (41)
October 29, 2018 DRAFT
33
where Ek(q) is the Eisenstein series given in (29) with k = n/2 and Sk,Λ(q) is a function (a so-called
cusp form) whose Fourier decomposition is of the form
Sk (z,Λ) =
∞∑
m=0
a (m,Λ) e2iπmz
where the Fourier coefficients behave as [28, Chap. 1]
a (m,Λ) = Oǫ
(
m
k
2
− 1
4
+ǫ
)
.
On the other hand, the Fourier decomposition of the Eisenstein series is
Ek(z) = 1 +
(2π)k
ζ(k)Γ(k)
∞∑
m=1
σk−1(m)e2iπmz
where σk−1(m) =
∑
d|m d
k−1 is the divisor function which behaves as
σk−1(m) = O
(
mk−1
)
.
By combining both Fourier coefficient estimations, we obtain that the Fourier coefficients of the theta
series ΘΛ(q) in (41), when n becomes large enough, is dominated by the Eisenstein series which only
depends on the dimension n. Consequently, when n grows, the theta series of all even unimodular lattices
behave like the Eisenstein series Ek(q), which, in terms of secrecy gain χΛ, means
χΛ ≈ (1.08)
n
2
for any n−dimensional (n large enough) even unimodular lattice Λ.
VII. WIRETAP LATTICE CODES
We conclude this paper by giving some examples of code construction.
A. An 8-dimensional 2-level nested lattice code construction
Suppose that Alice communicates with Bob using an 8-dimensional lattice. She needs to decide both
Λb, that encodes bits for Bob, and Λe, that contains random bits intended for Eve. She can take Λb = E8,
since this lattice has the best coding gain (Hermite constant) in dimension 8 [6]. Based on her knowledge
of Bob’s SNR, γb = Es/σ2b , and Bob’s desired error probability, Alice decides the shaping region R and
thus, the total rate R = Re +Rs of transmission.
Now Λe has to be a sublattice of E8, which first optimizes the secrecy gain. Since E8 is an extremal
lattice, all its scaled versions reach the lower bound on the maximal secrecy gain χ8 and consequently,
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we pick Λe = 2mE8. Note that the scaling factor has to be a power of 2 since Λe has to be a sublattice
of Λb = E8. This further quantizes the rate Rs as follows:
|E8/2mE8| = 28m ⇒ Rs = 2k
8
= 2m,
and we have from (27) that
R−Rs = Re
= log2(γe)− log2(2π)
=
γe(dB)
10
log2 10− log2(2π)
≃ γe(dB)
10
(3.32) − (2.65).
Thus since we are under the assumption that Alice knows Eve’s SNR, γe, she accordingly decides how
many random bits to send. For example
γe(dB) = 10 dB, Re ≃ 0.67
γe(dB) = 20 dB, Re ≃ 4.
Of course, the better Eve’s SNR, the more random bits are needed. Now, R is fixed by Bob’s SNR while
Re is given by Eve’s SNR which constraints the data rate to be
Rs = R−Re, Rs = 2m, m ∈ Z.
For example, if R ≈ 6 bits and Eve has a SNR of γe = 20 dB, then Alice can send Rs = 2 bits per
complex channel use, which means that Λe = 2E8.
The encoding is done via construction A, as explained in Section II. First as already seen earlier,
E8 =
√
2Z8 +
1√
2
(8, 4, 4) (42)
where C = (8, 4, 4) stands for the Reed-Mu¨ller code of length 8 and dimension 4 and since Z8 =
2Z8 + (8, 8, 1), we have
E8 =
√
2Z8 +
1√
2
(8, 8, 1) +
1√
2
(8, 4, 4). (43)
We denote by C† the quotient code C† = F82/C , or equivalently
F82 = C + C
† i.e., (8, 8, 1) = (8, 4, 4) + C†,
so that (43) becomes
E8 =
√
2Z8 +
1√
2
(8, 4, 4) +
1√
2
C† +
1√
2
(8, 4, 4) =
√
2Z8 +
1√
2
C†,
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and
√
2Z8 = E8 +
1√
2
C† ⇒ 2
√
2Z8 = 2E8 +
√
2C†.
Combining with E8 =
√
2Z8 + 1√
2
(8, 4, 4), we finally obtain a construction of E8 using 2E8:
E8 = 2E8 +
1√
2
(
(8, 4, 4) + 2C†
)
.
Now the k = 8 bits of information are used to encode (8, 4, 4) + 2C† (4 bits for (8, 4, 4) and 4 bits for
2C†). The 16 random bits on the other hand label 2E8. The encoding can be done again via construction
A, since we have from (42) that
2E8 = 2
√
2Z8 +
√
2(8, 4, 4),
for which we need 4 random bits for
√
2 ·(8, 4, 4) and the rest for 4Z8 (in particular, we need a minimum
of 4 random bits).
B. An 8-dimensional N -level nested lattice code construction
In the above example, Alice could choose the number of random bits to be sent since she knew Eve’s
SNR. Suppose now a scenario where Alice perfectly knows Bob’s SNR but has no idea of Eve’s SNR,
actually Alice does not even need to know that Eve is present. In this case, the idea we want to develop
is that Alice can decide a hierarchy of secret bits, ranking the data bits from the most secret to the least,
and encode them accordingly. In this case, the role of the random bits in the coset coding scheme is
played by the least secure bits, whose cardinality depends on Eve’s SNR. This idea has been formulated,
from an information theoretic point of view, in [30].
We now illustrate this idea by extending the example of Subsection VII-A.
First, we need a tower of nested lattices in dimension 8 [13]. We give in Table V the construction A
of all nested lattices from Z8 to 2Z8. This table is read by using a generic binary construction A
Λ = 2Z8 + C (44)
where C is an (8, k, d) code whose generator matrix Gk can be obtained by taking the k last rows of
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Lattice Λ Code C
Z8 (8, 8, 1)
D8 (8, 7, 2)
D24 (8, 6, 2) = (4, 3, 2)
2
L8 (8, 5, 2)
√
2E8 (8, 4, 4)
2L⋆8 (8, 3, 4) = (8, 5, 2)
⊥
2 (D⋆4)
2 (8, 2, 4) = (4, 1, 4)2 =
(
(4, 3, 2)⊥
)2
2D⋆8 (8, 1, 8) = (8, 7, 2)
⊥
2Z8 (8, 0,∞)
TABLE V
CONSTRUCTIONA FOR NESTED 8−DIMENSIONAL LATTICES
the following matrix G:
G =


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


. (45)
As all codes used in Table V are nested codes, all constructed lattices are nested lattices satisfying
Z8 ⊃ D8 ⊃ D24 ⊃ L8 ⊃
√
2E8 ⊃ 2L⋆8 ⊃ 2
(
D24
)⋆ ⊃ 2D⋆8 ⊃ 2Z8. (46)
Since this nested chain is periodic (2Z8 is just a scaled version of Z8), we can shift it in such a way that
we obtain the chain
1√
2
E8 ⊃ L⋆8 ⊃
(
D24
)⋆ ⊃ D⋆8 ⊃ Z8 ⊃ D8 ⊃ D24 ⊃ L8 ⊃ √2E8. (47)
While in Subsection VII-A we considered
1√
2
E8 ⊃
√
2E8,
we now get the same two nested (and scaled) lattices but with a finer chain of lattices in between.
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To transmit k information bits to Bob, that is
Rs =
2k
8
bits per complex channel use, Alice chooses again Λb = E8, and needs∣∣∣∣ 1√2E8/Λe
∣∣∣∣ = 2k.
For instance, to send k = 1 bit, Alice takes from (47) the lattice Λe = L⋆8. Similarly, for k = 2 bits, she
uses Λe =
(
D24
)⋆
.
Since Alice does not know Eve’s SNR, she decides the total rate R, based on the channel to Bob.
Suppose that Alice wants to encode a sorted block of ℓ information bits s = (s0, s1, . . . , sℓ−1), where by
sorted we mean that the bit order matters: the bits are ranked in decreasing order of confidentiality, that
is the first bit is the most confidential.
Let us start by showing how the coding is done using Λb = Z8. The extension to Λb = E8 will follow.
a) Lattice coding when Λb = Z8: Let us write
ℓ = 8q + r, 0 ≤ r < 8
obtained by Euclidean division of ℓ by 8, and accordingly we form q blocks sm = (s8m, . . . , s8m+7) of
8 bits each, m < q and get an extra block sq = (s8q, . . . , s8q+r−1, 0, . . . , 0) containing r bits. Each of
the q blocks of bits is encoded using the generator matrix G in (45):
cm = smG, cq = sqG
and the final transmitted point is
x =
q∑
m=0
2mcm (48)
translated by a constant vector, depending on the constellation, so that the mean value of the constellation
is 0.
Let us now see how it works. Let g0,g1, . . . ,g7 denote the rows of the matrix G. Thus,
cm = s8mg0 + s8m+1g1 + · · ·+ s8m+7g7, ,m = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1 (49)
and similarly
cq = s8qg0 + s8q+1g1 + · · ·+ s8q+r−1gr−1, (50)
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so that the final transmitted point of Equation (48) can now be written as
x =
q−1∑
m=0
2m (s8mg0 + s8m+1g1 + · · ·+ s8m+7g7) + 2q (s8qg0 + s8q+1g1 + · · ·+ s8q+r−1gr−1)
= s0g0 +
(
s1g1 + s2g2 + · · ·+ s7g7 + 2
q∑
m=1
2m−1cm
)
∈ s0g0 +D8.
Indeed,
1) The vector g0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) /∈ D8.
2) The term s1g1 + s2g2 + · · · + s7g7 is in D8 since the 7× 8 matrix whose rows are g1, . . . ,g7 is
the generator matrix of the (8, 7, 2) code which yields D8 via construction A.
3) The last term is obviously in 2Z8 which is contained in D8.
If s0 = 0, x ∈ D8, else x ∈ D8 + g0 and the minimum squared Euclidean distance between D8 and
D8 + g0 is equal to 1 which is the minimum distance of Z8 = Λb. Consequently s0 is the bit most
sensitive to noise, that is the one with highest bit error probability. Note that, from a reliability point of
view s0 is the worst bit whereas it is the best one, from a security point of view.
Let us repeat the process. We have
s1g1 +
(
s2g2 + · · ·+ s7g7 + 2
q∑
m=1
2m−1cm
)
∈ s1g1 + (D4)2
and the minimum squared Euclidean distance between (D4)2 and (D4)2 + g1 is the minimum distance
of D8, that is 2. The probability of correct decision on the bit s1 is then higher than for s0.
This process is iterated for sj , j = 2, 3, . . . , 7 where the lattice corresponding to the bit sj has a
minimum squared Euclidean distance larger or equal to the one of the bit sj−1. When reaching the bit
s8 (m = 1), we get the lattice 2Z8 (recall that we had Z8 for s0). The chain of lattices obtained for s1
is then the same one as for s0 scaled by a factor of 2. More generally, the chain of lattices for sm is the
same one as for s0 scaled by a factor of 2m, that is
Λm,κ = 2
m+1Z8 + 2m (8, κ, d)
based on the chain of codes (8, κ, d) of Table V by using a scaled construction A. The last block of r
bits will encode the cosets of the code (8, (8− r), d) giving the transmitted point
x =
((
q−1∑
m=0
2mcm
)
+ 2q (s8qg0 + s8q+1g1 + · · ·+ s8q+r−2gr−2)
)
+ 2qs8q+r−1gr−1
where, as above, the bit s8q+r−1 decides whether x ∈ Λq,8−r−1 or x ∈ Λq,8−r−1 + gr−1.
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Now,
x =

( q−1∑
m=0
2mcm
)
+ 2q
r−1∑
j=0
s8q+jgj

+ 2q (s8q+rgr + · · ·+ s8q+7g7)
where the bits s8q+r, . . . , s8q+7 label points of the lattice
Λs = 2
q+1Z8 + 2q (8, 8 − r, d)
whereas the other bits label the cosets in Λb/Λs whose coset representatives are chosen in the Voronoi
cell of the point 0 in Λs. Since s8q+r = · · · = s8q+7 = 0, they label the point 0 in Λs which can be
interpreted as saying that x is in the Voronoi cell of the point 0 in Λs. In other words, the Voronoi cell
of the point 0 in Λs is the shaping region R of the transmitted constellation [9].
b) Lattice coding when Λb = E8: We now extend the above encoding to the case where Λb = E8.
Take the block of information bits s = (s0, s1, s2, . . . , sℓ−1) and prepend 4 bits equal to 0 to form
s˜ = (0, 0, 0, 0, s0, s1, s2, . . . , sℓ−1) .
As above, we first compute
c0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, s0 , s1, s2, s3)G,
a codeword of the Reed-M ˜A14 ller code (8, 4, 4), which, by construction A gives a lattice point in E8,
after which the whole encoding procedure described for Z8 holds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered coding strategies based on lattices, for the Gaussian wiretap channel. From
the expression of the eavesdropper probability of correct decision, we derived the so-called secrecy gain,
a new lattice invariant related to theta series, which characterizes the amount of confusion that lattice
coding introduces at the eavesdropper. Since theta series of even unimodular lattices are well-understood,
we focused, in this paper, on the study of the secrecy gain of even unimodular lattices: we provided
explicit examples and an asymptotic analysis which shows that the secrecy gain grows exponentially in
the lattice dimension. Finally, worked out coding examples were given.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we review results that are needed to manipulate sums of periodic functions over
lattices. In particular, we will detail the Poisson summation formula over lattices and the Jacobi formula.
Consider the function F (x) =
∑
m∈Zn f(m+ x) which is periodic over [0, 1]n, for f a well-behaved
function, that is satisfying [8]
1) ∫
Rn
|f(x)| dx <∞
2) ∑m∈Zn |f(m+ u)| converges uniformly for all u belonging to a compact subset of Rn.
It has a Fourier series F (x) =
∑
n∈Zn ane
2πi〈n,x〉
, where
an =
∫
[0,1]n
e−2πi〈n,y〉F (y)dy
=
∑
m∈Zn
∫
[0,1]n
e−2πi〈n,y〉f(m+ y)dy
=
∑
m∈Zn
∫
[0,1]n+m
e−2πi〈n,u−m〉f(u)du
=
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈n,u〉f(u)du = fˆ(n)
where fˆ(n) is the Fourier transform of f , which is such that we can invert the sum and the integral in
the second step, and reconstruct the integral in the fourth step. Thus
F (x) =
∑
m∈Zn
f(m+ x) =
∑
n∈Zn
ane
2πi〈n,x〉 =
∑
n∈Zn
fˆ(n)e2πi〈n,x〉
which yields, in x = 0, the so-called Poisson summation formula:
∑
m∈Zn
f(m) =
∑
n∈Zn
fˆ(n). (51)
One can be more general and consider summing f on the points of an arbitrary lattice Λ, say with
generator matrix M , instead of Zn:
∑
m∈Λ
f(m) =
∑
x∈Zn
f(Mx) =
∑
y∈Zn
f̂ ◦M(y)
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using (51). Now
f̂ ◦M(y) =
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈y,x〉f(Mx)dx
= |det(M)|−1
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈(M
−1)Ty,u〉f(u)du
= |det(M)|−1fˆ((M−1)Ty),
giving the Poisson summation formula for lattices:
∑
m∈Λ
f(m) = |det(M)|−1
∑
n∈Λ⋆
fˆ(n) (52)
where Λ⋆ has generator matrix (M−1)T . The lattice Λ⋆ is the dual lattice of Λ (see also Definition 1).
Let ΘΛ(y) =
∑
r∈Λ e
−πy||r||2 be the theta series of Λ with generator matrix M , which we rewrite as
ΘΛ(y) =
∑
r∈Λ f(r), so as to apply (52):
ΘΛ(y) = |det(M)|−1
∑
n∈Λ⋆
fˆ(n)
where
fˆ(n) =
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈n,x〉f(x)dx
=
∫
Rn
e−2πi〈n,x〉e−πy||x||
2
dx
=
n∏
j=1
∫
R
e−2iπnjxj−πyx
2
jdxj
=
(
1√
y
)n
e−πy||n||
2/y.
We conclude that
ΘΛ(y) = |det(M)|−1
∑
n∈Λ⋆
(
1√
y
)n
e−πy||n||
2/y,
which yields the Jacobi’s formula [6]
ΘΛ(y) = |det(M)|−1
(
1√
y
)n
ΘΛ⋆(1/y), (53)
connecting the theta series of a lattice and its dual.
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